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ABSTRACT

Children

at

ages

and

4

were

7

presented

three

stories, one in each of three causality versions, in
order
to

determine

influenced
story.

by

the strength of the causal

about

constrained
inference

are

inference ability and

recall

chain

in

are
the

For each story, children were asked two inference

questions

were

whether

logical

causality,

by story information,

questions.

used

Three

two

and two

questions

unconstrained

question-timing

conditions

to address issues concerning when

inferences

drawn

in

story

influenced

by

the total amount of information

comprehension

and

Questions were asked either on-line,
story, or not at all.

children

were

how

they

are

provided.

or at the end of the

Following completion of each story,

asked to retell it,

and were

then

asked

premise information questions.
Four-year

were

recall

information,

olds'

story

enhanced when

comprehension
provided

unaffected by causality version.

also

benefitted

from additional

older chidren did not.
of

physical

and

causlity

while 7-year olds' comprehension and recall

were

patterns

ability

usage

story

Younger

children

material,

while

Finally, developmental changes in
logical,

of

unconstrained inferences were evident.
i

v

constrained,

and
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The main goal of this research was to specify
some

elements in the progress of comprehension and recall of
stories during development.
Major advances in our
understanding of text comprehension have been made in
recent years,

with theoretical accounts of

only very recently converging toward
This

research

attempted

to

unified model.

a

delineate

comprehension

the

process of

inference-making abilities, and thus, to contribute to
this developing model.

Before explication of the

experimental paradigm utilized here, some of the major
approaches to understanding text which influenced it will
be reviewed.

Background

S tor y

gxa.mma.r_s..

Several

accounts

have

attempted

to

characterize the critical

importance of the structure of

stories

Mandler, 1980;

Mandler

(e.g.,
&

Johnson

&

Kintsch,

Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975; Stein

1979; Thorndyke, 1977).

&

1977;

Glenn,

The major assumption in all of

these attempts is that stories have

and that people use their

a

canonical structure,

implicit knowledge of this

structure to guide comprehension and recall.
1

The

2

knowledge of story structure is generally considered to
exist as a schema,

consisting of expectations concerning

elements to be found and relations that will hold between

elements (Johnson
as a code at

having

&

Mandler, 1980).

the time of

may also

it

retrieval,

with individuals

set of ordered categories, independent of story

a

content,

at

their

disposal

(Mandler,

Mandler

1978).

points to three primary functions of

(1978)

serve

First, it directs attention to

schema.

a

general area of memory,

a

which indicates to the reader the type of information

which is to be retrieved; second,

it

provides

sequence to find specific content;

a

temporal

the schema

third,

allows the individual to generate an approximation,

if the

exact content cannot be retrieved.

Detailed analyses of story structure follow from the

analysis by Rumelhart (1975) of the story structure as
grammar, with the representation of the story comprised of

syntactic

semantic

and

components

involving

the

categorization of events and the causal relations between
categories.

1980;

Many investigators

Mandler

Thorndyke,

1977)

&

Johnson,

(e.g.,

1977;

Johnson

Stein

&

&

Mandler,

Glenn,

1979;

have argued that "rewrite rules" contain

knowledge about the generic structure of stories; and the
schema which is implicit in these rules

used in

a

top-down fashion to encode

a

(or

grammars)

is

story in chunks

3

corresponding to the rules and to generate expectancies
about the nature of the story structure.
In Johnson &
Mandler"s (1980) grammar, the important components of this

argument may be seen.
of

In general,

a

hierarchical network

story categories and the logical relationships

connecting the categories is used.

The episode is the

basic unit of analysis, containing two elaborative
branches.
functions

Each

— either

of

these

of the story.

perform

different

allowing the development of the story,

or setting the stage for

cases however,

branches

multi-episode stories.

the episode forms the

In both

initiating elements

The hierarchical network continues with the

beginning followed by develop m ent

.

where goals of the

protagonist may be seen, or some action may take place.
Depending on the sequence in the development stage, either
a goal path

(following the former sequence), or a reaction

(following the latter sequence), may be instantiated.
of these paths will then result in an outcome

,

signifying

whether or not the protagonist attained the goal.

final

category,

the ending.,

One

The

represents long-range

consequences of the development stage, or responses by
story characters to that stage.
In recent years,

a

good deal of support for this type

of analysis has been established.

One avenue of research

4

has

focused on

stories

whose

structure

violates

canonical structure described in the grammar;

the

while

a

second has looked at patterns of category emergence in
both recall tasks and importance

Mandler, 1978; Mandler
Johnson, 1977;
1978).

Stein

Mandler

presented

&

ratings

DeForest, 1979;

&

Glenn, 1979; Stein

Johnson

&

story)

(to

(1977),

(e.g.,

Mandler

&

&

Nezworski,

for

example,

first-graders, fourth-graders, and adults with

tape-recorded

stories

and

found

recall

varied

significantly with age, but pointed to the finding that
there was

a

(setting,
groups.

similar ordering among categories in recall

beginning,
Mandler

complexity

and

development,

&

outcome,

etc.)

in

the

three age

Johnson conclude from this that while

elaborations

may

become

richer

with

even the youngest subjects are sensitive to

the underlying structure of stories and use this schema to

organize

their

Mandler

retrieval.

&

DeForest

(1978)

presented third-graders, sixth-graders, and adults with
stories in either

a

canonical or an interleaved format.

The finding that younger children recalled the story in
canonical form,

led Mandler

&

regardless of the condition they were

DeForest to claim that not only can young

children use the story schema to guide their retrieval

appears as
organization.

in,

though
In

it

is

general,

the

— it

preferred mode of

much of the work on story

5

grammar representation indicates that

it may serve as a

guide to understanding the processing which must take

place

the

in

comprehension

of

a

story,

and

how

expectancies within stories are developed.

While the schema concept is widely employed, there
does exist some disagreement concerning the level at which

expectancies are generated.
provides only

within

a

Kintsch

(1977),

example,

for

a

global description of structural elements

story,

without emphasizing the incorporation of

prior expectancies that a reader might have about the

organization of
has

a

particular story.

Instead, his model

emphasized the analysis of the structure of text

propositions, and relations between propositions.

Kintsch

argues that while story structure does seem to be an

important

characteristic

comprehension,

in

an

analysis

of

story

the segmentation of text into categories is

done through a strategy based on cues in the text,

rather

than through a rule-based analysis of the story structure.

The global interpretation of the role of story

grammar representation as made by Mandler and her coworkers has not gone without empirical challenge as well.

McClure, Mason,

&

Barnitz (1978) used

a

scrambled story

technique in order to examine the role of surface text
features as well as the underlying story schema.

Using

third-graders, sixth-graders, and ninth-graders,
three
versions of each of six stories were used to
monitor the
effects of beginning

closely approximated
question, or with
this

study

Mandler

&

are

story with the setting (which most

a

a

story grammar structure), with

conclusion.

a

similar

in

a

While the findings of

some

respects to those of

DeForest (1977), in that young children seem

more dependent on "normal" structure than older children,
they also found evidence that in some cases,

also have an effect on story sequencing.

surface cues

While McClure,

et al., confined their discussion of surface cues to

a

brief mention of "salient lexical ties" and "specific

lexical items",

other

studies have attempted

specific delineation of factors

comprehension

of

stories.

a

more

which may operate in the

Frederikson

(1977),

in

a

summary of research which has been conducted with
"degraded" stories (scrambled order,
this problem.

deletions),

points to

He suggests the necessity of being aware of

alternative explanations for many of the results obtained,

including

the

use

of

text-based cues

and

text-based

inferences which may generate coherence in a narrative as

well as in recall protocols.

In other words,

a

set of

important concerns remain centered on whether text-based

components of these story grammar categories need to be
identified

in

order

to

understand

how

the

grammar

—
7

operates,

and how the developing process of
comprehension

skills proceeds.
£c_jice_p_£ua.l

s_cJie_ma.s_.

Most of the research in this

direction may be traced to the influence of the work
of
Schank & Abelson (1977). Their examination of research
from a wide diversity of disciplines (including
linguistics and artificial intelligence) suggested two
major points which can be seen developing in current
thinking about story comprehension.
that

widespread agreement

has

First, they assert

been

developing

that

semantic features are considerably more important than had
previously been believed;

and second,

the role of context

has come to be seen as overwhelmingly important in the

interpretation of text.

The implications of these two

factors for text comprehension is that while text content
guides the process of understanding,
to understanding

important components

are located outside the text itself

primarily in the knowledge of actions and causality which
the reader or listener brings to the task.

This type of

mental representation is defined by Schank
(1977)

as a script,

&

Abelson

which they argue functions in the

interpretation of stories and aids in the prediction of
likely sequences of events.

Nelson, Fivush, Hudson,

Lucariello (1982) have also argued

&

that the scriptal

8

organization points to temporal and causal
between components of narratives, with a

particular

sequential structure of events called for

in

context.

relations

given

a

Relations between details in the narrative are

considered optional

this

in

scheme with the

constraint being that they are described in

only

a

manner

logically consistent with the broad structure.

Major

support for these claims comes from work

with adult

subjects

in

Bower, Black,

(e.g.,

Turner, 1979)

&

which it

has been found that there is often confusion of actions

which are implied by the scriptal organization of stories

with

stated actions.

Scriptal

knowledge and use of

scripts in story recall with chilren has been examined by

Nelson and her co-workers
Nelson,

Nelson

Nelson,

1979;
&

McCartney

(e.g.,

Fivush,

Gruendal, 1981).

Hudson,

&

In general,

Nelson,

1981;

Lucariello,

1982;

&

it has been found

that young children's knowledge about routine events fits
the script model,

reports,

with a great deal of commonality among

reliable

and

sequencing

children (Nelson, 1979; Nelson
of

scripts

in

story

recall

McCartney

&

recall

stories was

of

Nelson (1981)

&

actions

between

Gruendel, 1981).

The use

has

of

also

been

promising.

found that young children's

influenced by

sequences as opposed to state knowledge.

event

knowledge

They also found

that changes in the story during recall reflected the fact

9

that detail

information is not as tightly constrained
as
event sequencing, and that logically
consistent changes
were the predominant type of changes made.

According to Schank (1977) the representation
of text
in memory,

which exists as

connected actions and states,

dependency th e o ry.

primitive

a

sequence of causally

is

described by conceptual

This theory describes conceptually

elements

representing

actions and states in such

specific

classes

of

way as to ensure that

a

sentences which differ in language but are identical in
meaning have only one representation, and that information

which is implicit in the text will be explicit in the
representation of the text in memory.

This view, that the

text will be decomposed into underlying states or actions,

and that representation of

unfolding of

a

text

influenced by the

is

chain of events over time has recently been

the focus of many researchers.

More specifically, the

causal connections between states and actions has been the

primary point

emphasis,

of

with the study

of

the

inferential process assuming an increasingly important

role

(e.g.,

Omanson,

in

Graesser,

Nicholas,

1981;

&

van der Broek,

Warren,

Nicholas,'

&

Anderson,

&

Omanson, Warren,

press;

Trabasso, Secco,

Robertson,

&

Trabasso,

1983;

Trabasso,

1981;
1978;

Trabasso
1979).

&

£Y£Ht steins and inferences

Most developmental

.

studies

which address the question of the role
of inferences in
text comprehension have looked at
children in
5the

11-year-old range (Paris
1978),

and while

few

a

&

to

Upton, 1976; Omanson, et al.,

studies have employed younger

children and noted significant improvements
in
performance, they leave unanswered many questions
about
potential underlying processing differences.

Poulsen,

Kintsch,

Kintsch,

and

Premack

For example,

(1979)

using

picture stories, tested 4-year olds and 6-year olds
and
found 6-year olds better able to make stories out
of

scrambled pictures, but found 4-year olds performed
quite

well in recall of "ordered" stories.

They suggest that

while 4-year olds can provide inferences within

a

clearly

regularized story format to link different components of
the

story,

only

inference-making
pictures.

the

older

procedure

children use some sort of
to

link

randomly

ordered

Similarly, Wimmer (1980) studied children in

the 4-year-old range in a task involving comprehension of

"well-structured" and "destructured" text.
it

In this study,

was found that although 4-year olds showed better

recall

of

the

well

structured than the destructured

version, they did not show "full comprehension" of text
material.

Importantly,

Wimmer questions,

"what prevents

full comprehension?" and suggests that the answer may lie

11

in a lack of relevant world
knowledge,

specifically the

knowledge required to figure out the
specific causal
connections between the states, actions, and
events of the
story.
This interpretation of performance
differences is
interesting, and clearly suggests the necessity
for more

work with children of these ages if we are
to delineate
just what is involved in the inferential
process in story
comprehension.

According to Nicholas

&

Trabasso (1981),

there are a

number of problems which need to be addressed in any
attempt to carefully examine the role of inference
in the

comprehension process.

Basically,

the problems center on

the question of how the term "inference" is defined— with

almost as many definitions as there have been researchers

interested
different

the

in

question.

The

fact

that

slightly

meanings have been employed in the development

of theoretical arguments may reflect the many types of

inferences which may exist rather than
communication problem.

Recently,

Hildyard

&

a

serious

Olson (1978)

have reviewed general categories of usage of the term

inference in their attempt to differentiate inferences

into

three

main

classification,

classes.

In

their

system

of

proposi tional inferences refer to the

implications of explicit propositions.

A defining

12

characteristic of prepositional inferences
is that it is
the form of the proposition, rather
than the content which

determines inference making.

Included in this

classification are many types of inferences which
have
been described by other researchers.

Inhelder

(e.g.,

&

comparative terms

Piaget,
(e.g.,

1958;

Olson

class inclusion relations

Transitive relations

&

(e.g.,

Trabasso,

Nickerson,
Griggs,

subsumed under this general heading.

1975),

1977),

1976)

and

are all

The second class

described are referred to as enabling inferences which are

determined by both content and form,
Hildyard

and are seen by

Olson as the links between concepts in

&

which otherwise would not form coherent units.

story

a

Their

final classification is comprised of pragmatic inferences

which are considered useful in elaborating text material,
but not seen as necessary for comprehension.

primarily,

from

implicit

world

They result,

knowledge

which

the

individual brings to the task.

Although the classification model proposed by
Hildyard

&

Olson is useful as

a

beginning step, their

interpretation of developmental differences reveal its
limitations.

A major conclusion centers on the finding

among children in the 10- to 12-year-old age range that

there

is

an

increasing

pr opositional from

ability

to

pragmatic inferences.

differentiate
According to

13

Hildyard

&

Olson,

this change was the result of older

children's

ability to reject pragmatic inferences
as
necessarily true; an ability grounded in
increased
"schooled competence",

inferencing ability.

rather than the development of any
in a related study using 6-,

8-,

and

10-year olds, Hildyard (1979) attempted to
substantiate
the claim that different types of inferences
exist, and
that there are developmental differences in
usage.

She

found that the youngest children were as capable as the
older children in providing integration and implicit

inferences (which are subclasses of the pragmatic and
enabling

inferences discussed above),

but were unable to

draw formal, or propositional, inferences.

In considering

both of these studies, it seems as though the nature of
underlying process changes are left unexplored.

While the

distinctions serve as an aid in thinking about past work
involving inferences with children, they demonstrate more

decisively the breadth of related issues which need to be
addressed.

h taxonomy:

Nicholas

Trabasso

&
&

ojL

inferences

Trabasso

.

A series of papers, including

(1981),

Omanson,

et

al.,

Nicholas (1981), and Warren, et al.,

(1978),
(1979),

have been focused on the underlying processing changes
which accompany the development of inferential reasoning.

14

in particular, these researchers
have been developing a
taxonomy of inferences, based upon

their

relationship between events in

story.

a

functional

According to

their arguments, some model of language
understanding must

encompass any formal definition of inferences,
and as was

suggested above,

great deal of this theoretical

a

foundation is evident in Schank

representation.

&

Abelson's (1977) work on

The event chain model presupposes the

individual to be a flexible processor of information—able
to

develop

(using

starting point)

information in the narrative as
a

a

structure using knowledge about

available connections between events rather than applying
a

preconceived higher order structure.

Warren, et al.,

provide

(1979)

a

description of an

event chain representation which both indicates important

components of the model and relates it to categories found
in

story grammar

represented in

a

representations.

Text

structure

is

non-hierarchichal fashion, with this

representation being the result of an analysis of seven
main proposition types and their logical connectives.

Proposition types include

a

state which describes the

conditions of the physical world, or the conditions of
character in

a

story.

a

Events are changes of state, and

consist of two main types--those initiated by the
protagonist

and

those

occuring

independently

of

the

15

protagonist.

Changes of state which occur as

a

result of

the protagonist's voluntary behavior
are referred to as
aciiona (internal counterpart—cognition)
and since the
event chain model description is
considered from
,

the point

of view of the protagonist all other
state changes are

simply events.

Involuntary reactions are classed into

digplays? and ifil£ui^s--corresponding to external
movements

and internal states, including affect,
intuitions, and
beliefs.
The final proposition type, the qoal may be
either a voluntary or involuntary internal mental
event
r

representing desires or
protagonist.

The

plans which are held by

logical

the

connectives which describe

relations between propositions include inferential
relations, which have become the focus of much work in
this area.

Warren, et al., (1979) claim that inferences may be

based on three types of information.

The first of these

involves the basic causal connections which occur between

different events and are the result of logical relations.
Inferences based on logical relations are basic structures

which allow

a

developed here,

narrative to exist.

Within the system

these logical inferences may be of one of

four classes including motivational inferences,

which

involve inferring causes for characters' voluntary

16

thoughts or actions;

physical

cause

inferences which

require inferring "mechanical causes"
for events or states

which follow in the story; psychological
causation
inferences

involving the characters'

involuntary actions;

and enablement inferences, where story
conditions which
are stated are necessary but not sufficient
for
a

particular event to have occurred.

A

second type of

inference centers on informational relations involving
people,

objects,

times, places,

of a particular narrative.

etc.,— the general context

Informational inferences do

not deal with causes or consequences and are not tied to

intra-pr oposi tional

relationships.

Five

informational inferences are specified,

types

of

including

pronominal inferences which specify the antecedents of

pronouns; referential inferences which specify the
antecedents of actions or events and clarify the roles of

people

and

objects

in

related

propositions;

spatio-

temporal inferences which are used to establish times and

places within the story; world-frame inferences which

primarily serve the function of setting constraints on
possible interpretations; and elaborative inferences which

serve

to

add detail

to

a

story

— generally

irrelevant

circumstances to the progression of the story.

A third

type of inference involves judgements about aspects of the

narrative such as characters' action,

authors'

intentions,

17

etc.

These inferences which are primarily
evaluative in
nature, draw upon the individual's
values surrounding the
situation described.

Related to the taxonomy of

inferences described

above, are questions concerning how and
when inferences
are made.
One line of argument is that inferencing
is an

automatic process and all possible inferences
will be
generated; a second argument holds that
limits need to be

established to describe the comprehension process.
Trabasso and his

co-workers hold the belief

that an

individual makes only those inferences which are
"relevant
to the progress of the narrative", a belief they
refer to

as the relevancy hypothesis (Warren, et al., 1979).

the

context

inferential

this

of

hypothesis,

constraint are proposed,

four

degrees

including

in

of

those

consistent with, but undetermined by the text (usually

considered

determined

elaborative
but

or

unconstrained

irrelevant

inferences);

inferences,

constrained by material in the narrative;

which

are

determined and

relevant inferences, which are more tightly constrained

because they are important to the development of the
story;

and lastly,

those which are overconstr ained or

redundant inferences which duplicate given information.
Warren,

et al.,

(1979)

suggest that those inferences which
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are both determined and relevant are
most likely to be

made

since

they

comprehension.

are

necessary

for

event-chain

Undetermined and irrelevant inferences are

considered to be unnecessary to understanding,

their only

contribution being one of embellishment of the
narrative.
It is important to note, however, that
the effect of these

inferences may not be trivial in recall, and significant
developmental changes may occur in their usage.
I4e_a_sj2jLejT!ejit

o_f.

inferences.

Most theories of narrative

representation and comprehension have been supported using

free recall as the primary dependent measure.
discussed earlier,

As

the use of recall has been related to,

and used to support the notion of underlying structural

dimensions

Johnson,
Graesser

in

1977;
(1981)

stories

with

Rumelhart,

some

success

Thorndyke,

1977;

1980; Bower, Black,

&

Turner,

Whenever free recall is used as

there is

a

&

1977).

points to similar success in recall-based

analyses of scriptal theories as well
Bower,

(Mandler

(e.g.,

Black

&

1979).
a

dependent measure,

representation being tapped which relies on

connections made between events in the narrative through
logical inferences.

It is becoming apparent that the role

of inference-making as a component of the understanding

process has been implicit in much of the work done in the

area

of

story

comprehension.

Using

the

event-chain
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representation as

basic assumption, it may be argued
in press; Warren & Trabasso,
1979) that

(Omanson,

inferences

are

a

acts

of

comprehension,

measurement an alternative

(or

and

their

addition) to the use of

free recall in specifying degree of understanding.
In

number of papers

a

Anderson,

1981;

Swinehart,

Graesser,

1980),

(Graesser,

Robertson,

&

Robertson,

Lovelace,

&

Graesser and his co-workers have

attempted to examine the usefulness

of

employing

inferential components to delineate the comprehension
process.

The primary technique used here has been to

expose inferences made during comprehension.

Questions

which may be asked include "why-" and "how-" questions
which expose causal information (and fall into the logical
inference category specified by Warren, et al., 1979);
"where-",

to

"what-",

and "who-" questions which are similar

the broad category

discussed earlier.

of

informational inferences

Graesser, Robertson,

(reported in Graesser, 1981) used

procedure

to

explore

the

role

a

of

examined the effect of

(1980)

conditions.

&

Clark (1980),

question-answering

context

interpretation of an inference question.
al.,

and

in

the

Graesser, et

three

context

In the no-context condition subjects were

presented with

a

target statement in isolation,

with that
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statement probed by questions requiring
inferences.

The

prior-context condition included, along
with the target
statement,

the narrative events immediately
preceding it;

while in the full-context condition,

the subject received

the entire passage before the target statement
was probed.

Using these different levels of context condition,

it was

possible to develop a model which predicted from where
the
final inference representation would be generated.
While

conclusions drawn from their analysis are varied,
seem most central to their arguments.

a

few

To begin with, it

is the set of prior sentences,

rather than the immediately

preceding

is

sentence,

inferences to be made

that

—a

most

responsible for

finding which implies that

a

given sentence is linked to a representation in memory of

some integrated information.
inferences associated to

a

A second finding was that

given statement are rarely

generated by subsequent information.

inferences associated with

a

established upon its occurrence,

Virtually all of the

given statement will be
a result of the

statement

alone, or by the statement together with prior context.
Finally, and related to the previous finding, the later in
a

narrative

the

target

statement

is,

the

higher

the

likelihood of its producing inferences which remain in the
final

representation.

The findings of Graesser and his co-workers lend
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themselves well
earlier,

to

the

causal

chain model

discussed

and the question-answering procedure
for probing

this representation appears to be

a

useful technique for

establishing how actions and events in a
narrative are
conceptually related (Graesser, 1981; Warren,
et al.,
1979).
Lehnert (1977) argues that the ability to answer

questions

the

is

comprehension,
often,

strongest

demonstration of

preferable even to recall measures because

reasonable recall

of

a

without including any inferences,
real understanding.

be

seen

as

text

an

even

Warren,

narrative can be made
which are necessary for

et al.,

stronger

(1979)

take what may

position on this

issue,

beginning with the assumption that the event chain model

presupposes

the

making

of

component of comprehension,
recall.

claimed,

A

inferences as an

integral

leading to more complete

questioning procedure may be used,

to

it

is

promote the making of text-connecting

inferences during the listening to, or reading of, text.

Statement

oJL

the Problem

The present study was formulated to address some of
the issues raised in the preceding discussion.

7-year-old children were asked

a

Four- and

specific set of questions

.

22

either "on-line" at the earliest
opportunity during the
story presentation, or at the end of
the story,
or not at

all.

Each

child listened to

representing

critical

three

stories,

each

different level of causal relation in
a
story event; physical, psychological,
or

enablement.

a

within each story,

three types of

inference

constraint levels were specified—logical,
constrained
informational, and unconstrained informational.
At the

completion of each story, children were asked to
recall
the story and determine whether each of a
series of six
pictures "went with the story".

After hearing all three

stories, children were again shown all the pictures and

probed as to their reasons for accepting or rejecting
each
The three question-timing conditions were employed in

order to ascertain whether there is a developmental change
in ability to generate inferences as a function of amount

of information provided in a story.

by

Graesser

et al.,

and his

1980)

co-workers

The findings reported

(Graesser ,1981;

Graesser,

suggest that information which follows

a

target statement does not aid in inference-making ability,
and while this apparently is

adult

comprehension,

children.

It

has

it

been

is

a

reasonable description of

less

apparent with young

suggested

by

a

number

of

researchers that world knowledge may be the limiting
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factor in young children's lack of ability
to make causal

connections necessary for comprehension of
narratives.
Although the end-of-story condition does not
increase
world knowledge, it does provide in subsequent
story

—

events— information which will clarify and/or constrain
the inferences required of a given target
sentence.

It

was therefore hypothesized that while older
children
should reveal no differences in ability to infer
or recall
as

a

function of question-timing,

younger chilren should

perform better on inference questions and recall measures

when provided with more complete story information before

questioning,

i.e.,

in

the

end-of-story condition.

Following the claim made by Warren, et

comprehension

is

al.,

(1979) that

influenced by the making of text

connecting inferences, it is further hypothesized that
children in the two questioning conditions will perform

better in recall than children in the no-question
condition.

Three levels of inference constraint (logical,

constrained

informational,

informational)

are also included in this study.

and

unconstrained
This

manipulation, as well as the following one, is included in
an effort to address more directly the kind of question

raised by Wimmer (1980) and alluded to earlier, and more
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specifically to explore the usefulness
of the inference
taxonomy developed by Warren, et
al., (1979).
Logical
inferences represent the basic causal
connections between

events which

allow

narratives to exist,

and

reflect

conversational convention and basic linguistic
skills.
The central role of logical

inference-making

in

comprehension and communication leads to the
hypothesis
that at both ages, logical inferences will
be most likely

to

made

be

and

to

occur

in

recall

protocols.

Informational inferences determine the general context
of
a

narrative, and represent completeness of interpretation.

Constrained informational inferences which are determined
by,

and relevant to the

comprehension.

text

are

necessary

for

full

Indirectly, this type of inference

reflects the general description which was provided by

Hildyard

&

Olson

(1978)

with regard to 12-year olds'

increased facility in accepting or rejecting inferences as

necessarily true.

Since older chilren are likely to have

established representations of story events which include
many more connections with events and actions external to
the

story,

better

on

it

is

hypothesized that they will perform

inference

demands

reflecting this

constraint than younger chilren will.

type

of

Younger children

may be less constrained by representation demands,
however,

and thus produce informational inferences of the
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unconstained, undetermined, and irrelevant
types faster
than the older children will.
These

unconstrained

informational inferences may also be more likely
to turn
up in recall protocols of younger
children

following

questioning than with young children in the no-question
condition, since the representation of the story
is more
likely to include this type of inference after being
made

through

a

questioning procedure.

Further, differences

between younger and older children should be noted in
response reaction times, with older children displaying
faster

responding

to

constrained

than

unconstrained

inference probes, and young children showing no difference
in their response times to these two types of queries.

Warren,

et

al.,

(1979)

logical causality inferences:

identify

are

included

in

classes of

motivation, physical cause,

psychological cause, and enablement.

these

four

this

The last three of

study.

As

mentioned

previously, three versions of each of three stories were
constructed.

These varied in only one respect, the type

of logical inference required in one of the two logical

inferences in the complete story.

Understanding the nature of physical causality is one
of the earliest concepts acquired.

Nelson (1973), in

a

classification of earliest words used, found that very
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young children use words which represent
the production of
movements or changes in their world.

whiteman (1967)

using groups of 5- and 6-year olds and 8and 9-year olds,
conducted a study concerned with the

understanding of

psychological

causality.

The

comprehension of

short

stories related to psychological defense
mechanisms varied

significantly

with

age.

Younger

children

displayed

successful levels of understanding only 10% of
the time,
while older children were successful 71% of the
time,

a

follow-up study,

a

in

series of questions dealing with

physical causality were employed and it was found that
in

this case, age differences in performance were not
significant.
More recently, Glasberg & Aboud (1982)
studied

5- and

7-year-old

children

in

an

attempt to

discover age-related changes in emotional experience.

The

results of their study indicated that older children were

likely to attribute emotional states to

a

range of

experiences, including both physical and psychological
components.

Younger chilren,

this range of components.

in contrast,

did not display

They saw physical causes as

playing a much more causal role at all levels of emotional
experience.

Enabling relationships which leave the causal

link between events more ambiguous are likely to have
similar effect,
of

a

a

since they also require an understanding

range of potential causal factors.

For these
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reasons, it is hypothesized that
children of both ages
will perform similarly and do
their best when they
experience the physical causality
version of stories.
With the psychological causality and
enablement
versions,

however, the older children will be
more likely to produce

inferences

both comprehension and recall
than the
younger children will.
in

CHAPTER

II

METHOD

Fifty-four children in each of two age
groups
participated in the study. The range of ages
in each of

the groups was 4-years,

6-months to 5-years,

and 7-years,

6-months to 8-years, with an equal number of
boys and
girls at each age level. Seven four-year
olds
did not

complete the warm-up task, and were replaced.

All of the

children were from middle-class families in the greater
Springfield,
DejLisn.

Mass.

area.

The study employed a

condition)

x

3

(inference

2

(age)

x

3

constraint)

(question-timing
x

3

(causality

version) mixed design, with the last two factors within
subjects.

In order to ensure counterbalanced orders of

causality versions, and equal representation of each story
context,
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different

sequences balancing story context,

causality version, and order were generated, and one child
at each age in each question-timing condition was assigned
to each of these sequences.

Materials.

Three stories were created or adapted such

that all included the same type of target inferences.

They ranged from 80 to 84 words in length, and contained
nine or

ten propositions.

Three versions were generated

for each story according to the manipulation specified
28
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above.

All versions of the stories are to
be found in

Appendix

Each version of the three stories was

A.

recorded on a separate cassette in

a

single female voice.

Intonation, temporal, and intensity characteristics
of the

tapes were carefully balanced.
recorded using

a

The entire session was

second cassette recorder.

Two "warm-up" stories were also constructed and
given in fixed order to all children. The first of these
was 25 words long with four propositions, and the second
was 52 words in length with
are available in Appendix

propositions.

7

These, too,

The gradual increase in

A.

length and complexity was arranged to enable that each
child to understand the type of response required.

Eighteen pictures (black and white line drawings)
were created,

with six pictures used in conjunction with

each of the three stories.

For each of the stories,

three

pictures reflect either stated or inferred text material,

while the remaining pictures depict non-story events.

Two

pictures were developed for use with the second warm-up
All pictures are included in Appendix

story.

B.

Five plates from the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test

(PPVT)

were used to assess the younger children's

familiarity with concepts employed in the stories.
may also be seen in Appendix

Procedure

.

After

children

These

B.

became acclimated to

the

.
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laboratory setting,

they and their parent(s)

to play the "story game" in a nearby
room.

then told that he or she would hear

asked questions

about

For

it.

were invited
The child was

story and would be

a

all

children,

the

experimenter then played the first warm-up story on the
tape recorder, asking two premise questions
and two
inference questions at the end of the story.

After this

brief period of questioning,

then asked

the child

to

re-tell

the

approval and encouragement.
then introduced,

the experimenter

story,

and provided

general

The second warm-up story was

with the experimenter employing on-line

questioning with children in this experimental group; end-

of-story questioning with

children

in

the

second

experimental group; and no questioning with children in
the third group.

Following completion of the story, all

children were asked to re-tell

it.

Following recall of

this story, all children were shown two pictures and asked
to tell whether or not they "show something that goes with

the story".

In this

warm-up task all children were also

probed for their reason for answering this question, in
order

to

ascertain whether

they

understood

the

task

requirements

The test materials were then introduced, with the
procedure for each child following that prescribed by the
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questioning condition and sequence to
which the child was
assigned. After free recall of each story,
two premise

information questions were asked

of

all children.

equalize the time elapsing before recall,

a

To

delay,

equivalent to the period needed to ask the
inference
questions in the end-of-story condition was
imposed for
all children in the on-line and no-inference-question
conditions.

Immediately following the premise information
questioning, all children were asked to determine whether

each of

a

series of six pictures showed something which

went with the story; and immediately after the third story
questioning was completed
pictures a second time,

— all

children were shown all 18

this time with probes concerning

their reasons for selecting or rejecting each picture.
Following presentation of all 18 pictures, the 4-year olds

were given an abbreviated vocabulary test with the PPVT

plates described above, to make sure that the term
"excitement" was not an unfamiliar one at this age.

C H A P T E R III

RESULTS

The presentation of
major sections.

results is organized in five

These include an analysis of responses to

inference questions;

examination of free recall data;

correlations between different free recall measures and
responses to inference questions; analysis of
responses to

pictures;

and

consideration

of

responses

to

premise

information questions and vocabulary items.
Inference questions

Correct

.

responding.

The

mean number of correct

responses to inference questions may be seen in Figure
as

a

function of age and causality version.

l

f

After

preliminary analyses showed no order, story version,

or

sex effects, an analysis of variance was carried out on

these

data

as

a

function

question-timing condition,
the mean number

of

of

and

age,

causality

inference type.

version,
Overall,

correct responses increased with age.

Four-year olds correctly answered an average of 4.11 of
the six questions asked for each story,

while 7-year olds

correctly

5.19

answered

F_(l,68) =46.38,

p_<.001.

an

average

of

questions,

The greatest number of correct

answers were given with the physical causality version
(4.89),

followed by the enablement version
32

(4.62),

and the

CAUSALITY

Figure

1.

VERSION

Mean number of correct responses as a
function of causality version and age.

.
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psychological causality version

effect

was

significant,

This causality

(4.44).

£(2,136) =3.25,

and

p_<.05,

Bonferroni i-tests indicated that only
performance in the
physical and psychological causality
versions differed
significantly (£(71)=2.54, p_<.05).
Furthermore, as may be
clearly seen in Figure 1, the age difference
in correct

answers

to inference questions differed with
causality

version (£(2, 136) =3.40, E <.05).

Performance on inference

questions in the physical causality version did not vary
significantly between 4- and 7-year olds,

while the mean

number of correct responses in the psychological causality

and enablement

function

of

versions increased significantly as

age

(Bonferroni

£'s(136)=

5.50,

a

3.06,

£' s<,05)

Age differences also occurred

responding in the on-line,

in the pattern of

and end-of-story question-

timing conditions in the three different causality
versions
condition,
2,

in

(age

x

causality

£(2,136) =3.02,

£=.05).

x

question-timing

As can be seen in Figure

performance on inference questions was about the same

both

question-timing conditions

versions among 7-year olds,
no

version

in

all

causality

and while 4-year olds showed

difference in ability to answer questions as

a

function of question timing in either the physical

or

psychological causality versions,

of

the mean number

CAUSALITY VERSION

Figure

2.

Mean number of correct responses as a
function of causality version, question-timing condition, and age.
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correct

responses

in

the

enablement

version

was

significantly greater in the end-of-st
ory question
condition

than

in

the

on-line

condition

(Bonferroni

£(136)=2.75, £<.05).
The

mean number of correct answers to inference
questions may be seen in. Figure 3 as a function of
age

and

inference type.

correct

Overall, children responded with more

answers

questions

to

about

unconstrained

inferences than to questions about logical or constrained

inferences;

the

means were

respectively, £(2 136) =68.45
,

5.46

4.89,

,

indicated significant differences

in

3.60,

Bonferroni t-tests

p_<.001.

,

and

performance between

unconstrained, and logical and constrained, and between
logical and constrained inference questions (Bonferroni

i's(136)= 3.05

,

8.34

,

7.82,

e's<.05).

Important age

differences, which help to clarify these results, also
were present, however.

Seven-year olds

inference questions best,

answered

while 4-year olds were most

facile with the unconstrained inference questions

inference type, £

(

2

,

1 3 6

logical

)

=3

1

.

3 2

,

p.<.001).

(age

x

Moreover,

younger children were significantly poorer at answering
either the logical or constrained inference questions than

they were at answering the unconstrained type question

(Bonferroni £(35)=5.53,
year olds,

p_'s<.05).

On the other hand, 7-

although most adept with the logical inference

.
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INFERENCE

Figure

TYPE

Mean number of correct responses as
a function of inference type and
age
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questions,

did

almost as well with unconstrained

questions, while showing significantly
less ability to
answer the constrained inference questions
(Bonferroni
i(35)=4.59, B<.05).
Even so, it is also apparent from
Figure

3,

that the performance of 7-year olds did not drop

as dramatically as that of 4-year olds when
asked to make

constrained inferences.

Logical inference questions were more likely to be

answered correctly in the physical causality version
for

(M=1.86

the

two questions of this type),

than in

either the psychological causality or enablement versions
(M's = 1.52 and 1.51,

respectively), 2(4, 272) =4.66

,

p_<.001.

This facilitating effect of the physical causality version
for answering inference questions was further supported by

examination of the causality version

x

question-timing condition interaction,
4,

£(4,272) =2.49,

version,

£<.05.

With

the

inference type
as

x

seen in Figure

physical

causality

children were able to answer all types of

inference

questions,

logical,

constrained,

or

unconstrained, equally well whenever the questions were
asked,

was

i.e.,

not

however.

the

on-line, or at the end of the story.
case

with

the

other

That

causality versions,

Logical inference questions in the psychological

causality version were more easily answered in the on-line

question condition, and constrained inference questions in
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the enablement version were more
readily answered in the

end-of-story question condition (Bonferroni
4.5,

£' s (7 1) =2.8

fi's<.05).

Tim£ £s

An analysis of variance was

JLfiSfifind.

carried out on the time to respond to
inference questions

answered correctly as

function of age, causality

a

version, question-timing condition, and inference
type.
Although there was no overall age difference in

response

times,

the average time to respond was affected by

inference type.

Logical inferences were made more rapidly

than constrained or unconstrained inferences
1.9, and 2.2

sec,

(M's=1.7,

respectively), £(2,136) =11.46, p_<.001.

As may be seen in Figure

the response time analysis

5,

also revealed an age pattern which was consistent with the

question-answering data described above.

Four-year

olds

were equally fast in responding to all types of questions,

while 7-year olds showed
fast

responding

with

a

clear progression from very

logical

inference

questions

to

significantly slower response times to constrained and

unconstrained
£'S (35) =2.79,

Free

recall

4.73,

,

p_

questions

(Bonferroni

s<.05).

.

Several
analyzed.

inference

dependent measures of

free

recall

were

These included several indices of idea units

(proportion of total idea units provided, proportion of
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central idea units provided, ratio of
central idea units
to total idea units in the protocols),
expansions or
elaborations,

number of words,

and comprehension ratings.

Preliminary analyses revealed no order,
sex effects of significance.
of

these measures was

timing condition)

x

3

a

or

The main analysis for each

mixed,

2

(age)

x

(causality version)

variance, with the last variable

Idea Units

story version,

a

3

(question-

analysis of

repeated measure.

Analysis of the proportion of total idea

.

units indicated that older children recalled more of
the

story than did younger children, 59.25% and 28.60%,
respectively, and this was the only significant effect
(£(1,102)=165.95,

p_<.001).

revealed similar

Analysis of central idea units

results,

with 7-year olds recalling

77.52% of the central idea units provided,

recalling 45.23%.

and 4-year olds

This was, again, the only significant

effect (£(1,102) =139.75, rK.OOl).

Analysis of the ratio

of central idea units to total idea units in each child's

recall

protocols revealed that although younger

do not recall as much as older children do,

children

more of their

recall is comprised of ideas central to the story.

Thus,

the proportion of 4-year olds' recall which was central

was 58.68%, while for 7-year olds, this proportion was
46.27% (£(1,102)=29.65, p_<.001).

Expansions

.

The number of ideas not expressed in
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the original story which were
included in recall protocols

also varied as

function of age, with 7-year olds

a

including in their recall an average of
2.14 expansions
per story, while 4-year olds included
an average of
1.49

expansions per story

(£(1,102)-

14.29,

Question-

p_<.001).

timing condition also affected the number
of expansions,
F_(2,102)=23.40,

B <.001.

The

average number

of

expansions

in the two question conditions did not
differ, but they

averaged

(fl-2.23)

significantly higher than the average

number of expansions in the no-question conditon
(M=.98)
(Bonferroni £(107)- 5.95, £K.05).
6,

As may be seen in Figure

this timing-of-question effect on expansions was

different with different causality versions,
(P_(4,204)=3.42, p_<.01).

however

Those children questioned at the

end of each story averaged 2.02,

2.27,

for

and enablement versions,

the physical,

respectively.

psychological,

Bonferroni i-tests

and 2.52 expansions

indicated that

the

number of expansions in recall of the physical causality

version was significantly less than for the enablement
version (£(204) =3.33
of

,

p_<.05)

,

while expansions in recall

physical causality and psychological causality

versions,

or

not differ

psychological and enablement versions,

significantly.

question condition,

i.e.,

did

Children in the on-line

those who were asked inference

questions during the story presentation,

showed

a
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CAUSALITY

Figure

6.

VERSION

Mean number of expansions as a function
of causality version and question-timing condition.
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different pattern of expansions.

More expansions

in

recall

occurred following the physical
causality version
(11=2.66) than following either the
psychological
(H-2.X9),

enablement

or

versions

(M-2.20J

(Bonferroni £'s

(204)«3.13, £<.05).

Numbec

&

w^ds.

Similar results were obtained in an

analysis of the number of words in the recall
protocols.
Older children's protocols were comprised
of more words
(M =

6 0

.

6 0

than

)

£(1,102)=119.63,

U<

younger

children's

(M=33.91),

Causality version also affected

.001.

the average number of words in children's recall.

The

number of words recalled following the physical causality

version averaged 49.88,

while the number of words

following the psychological version was 45.58, and the
number of words following the enablement version was 46.33
(£(2,204)= 4.03, fi<.05).

Comprehension ratings.
comprehension rating based on
of

recall,

It
a

is

interesting that

rather global

proved to be sensitive to

a

a

evaluation

number of

manipulations which were not detected by the more
constrained analyses on number of words and idea units.
These ratings were carried out by three naive raters who

were instructed to assign

1

to

5

points to each recall

protocol,

reflecting

Interrater

reliability was very high

degree

of

story
(97%

understanding.
agreement with
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7-year olds', and 92% with 4-year olds',
protocols); and
consistent with previous analyses,
7-year olds'
protocols

received
olds

a

higher rating (M = 3.49), than those of
4-year

(H=2.08),

causality

£(1,102)= 150.21, p_<.001.

version

(£(2,204) =3.03,

clearly

£=.05).

affected

At

both ages,

comprehension

Comprehension of the physical

causality version was rated as greater

(H = 2.*90) than for

either the psychological causality version
(H-2.75), or
the enablement version (M=2.71) (Bonferroni i's
(107) =2.24,
2.29,

p_'s<.05).

As may be seen in Figure 7,

different

effects of question-timing condition were noted for each
age level,

however

(£(2,102) =5.41,

e<.05).

Although it was

expected that the comprehension of 4-year olds in either
of the two question conditions would be enhanced by the

questions, and the results were in the predicted direction

(average comprehension rating for question conditions,
average rating for the no-question condition,

2.13;

these

differences were not significant.

Older

1.98),

children,

for whom it was believed the question condition was not

critical,

revealed an interesting pattern of results.

Their comprehension was rated highest in the no-question

condition

(M=3.74),

and

while

average

comprehension

ratings in the end-of-story question condition did not
differ
for

significantly from

this

(11=3.59),

average

ratings

the on-line question condition were significantly

.

0
w
•

3-

C
o
—

QUESTION

Figure

7

Tl

MING

CONDITION

Mean comprehension rating as a function
of question-timing condition and age.
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lower (M = 3.16)(Bonferroni £'s(108)

=

4.14

f

3.07,

E 's<.05).

It appears that for older
children, answering inference

questions during the processing of story
material

is

disruptive and leads to impaired recall.

Relations among dependent measurps.

For a number

of

theoretical and practical reasons, the
relations between

a

number of the dependent measures described
above were
examined.

The argument put forth by Graesser

Trabasso and his colleagues (Warren, et
question-answering is

a

addition,

measures as

to

recall

al.,

1979)

that

or

good

reasonable alternative,
a

means

and

(1981),

of

a

studying

comprehension processes has not been adequately studied;
the correlations between responses to inference questions

and

various recall measures were seen as addressing that

issue.
of

A second concern resulted from the large variety

approaches to assessing recall that

recently.

have surfaced

Examination of correlations between various

recall measures themselves, was seen as potentially useful
in identifying strengths or weaknesses of measures.

Table

shows that the correlations between correct

1

answers to inference questions and recall measures were
very high,
r.=

+ .73 for

range,

it

and quite similar,

ranging from

the four recall measures.
is

r.=

+ .69

to

Within this narrow

still of some interest that the greatest

degree of relationship was between inference question

Table

1

Corre l ations between Inference Questions
and Recall Measures

Responses t£ inference questions

aU
£fg
measures

^1

sample

4-ye^r olds

7-vear
olds
YV<?l1
VXUi?
'

Comprehensi on
rating

+.72*

+.53*

+ .26

Total idea
units

+.71*

+.51*

+ .10

Central idea
units

+.73*

+.51*

+.13

Number of
words

+.69*

+.38*

+.28

*p<.001
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responses and the proportion of recall
protocols which
represented central idea units.

A core of comprehension

apparently can be tapped either through
questions
derived recall measures of this sort.

responses

related

only

comprehension ratings,

minutely

or

Inference question

less

well

with

the

again support for the notion that

these indices, although applied at different times,
and
representing very
different levels of measurement,
were

assessing

least,

a

common understanding.

In general terms, at

questions about inferences made during text

processing are getting at similar comprehension processes

to

those called upon in recall.

correlations

Of

course,

the

drop off considerably when age groups are

examined separately. This was especially true with the
older children,

reflecting the very little variability in

inferencing ability at this older age, with the particular

questions employed.

The second question centers on comparisons between
the various recall measures employed in this study.

can be seen in Table

2,

for the full sample,

dependent

measures

correlated,

ranging from .r=+.85 to

are

all

highly
r_=+.93.

age groups were considered separately,

relations remain strong.

with respect to word count.

and

As

these

similarly

Even when the

most of these

The most apparent change was
At age 7, the number of words
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Table

2

Corre l ation ? among Recall Measure s
(all significant at p<.001)
,

Full sample

Total idea
units

+ .93

Central idea
units

+.90

+ .93

Number of
words

+ .87

+ .90

ComprehenTotal
sisn rating
idea u nits

4-year olds

To ta l idea
units

+ .89

Central idea
units

+.84

+ .89

Number of
words

+ .80

+ .88

+ .85

Central
idea units

+ .79

ComprehenTotal
Central
Sion ratings idea units idea units

7-year olds

Tot a l idea
units

+ .84

Central idea
units

+.72

+ .77

Number of
words

+ .54

+ .64

+ .50

Total
Central
Comprehension ratings idea units idea units

.
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in recall clearly did not relate
as highly with the other

measures, reflecting no doubt the quite
complete, quite
invariant, size of recall protocols for these
stories at
this age.
It may well be that simple word counts
are
useful indices of comprehension only for younger
children.

Not surprisingly, since both of these measures
are

based on idea unit scoring,

maximum correlation was

obtained between total idea units and the proportion of
central idea units in recall.
of

a

More interestingly, no less

relationship was shown between total idea units and

the comprehension ratings, and in this instance, no common

metric could be contributing.

Several additional factors

point to the merits of the comprehension ratings as well.
First, it is a technique which can be readily and reliably

employed by naive judges with minimal instruction. More
importantly, the ratings were as sensitive as any other

measure to most variables of interest in this study, and
at the same time provided a more detailed picture of age-

related question-timing effects.

Apparently,

the

comprehension rating was able to capture some global
quality of the protocol which could not be characterized
as well by those other measures involving discrete

components
Res ponse? io pictures

.
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Responses to pictures were scored
by three naive
raters on a scale from

0

to

if the child's response to

2.

picture was completely in error,
that response was
scored as zero.
if the child not only gave
the correct

a

answer,

but also provided an appropriate
rationale,

response was scored as two.

that

A score of one was given if

the response was correct but rationale
was wrong, or if
the
response was wrong but the rationale
made

sense of a

wrong answer. The analysis conducted on
these scores
a

mixed

2

(age)

x

3

(question-timing condition)

was
x

3

(causality version) analysis of variance with
the last
variable a repeated measure.
Older children's

responses

to pictures

received an average score of 10.43, and the
average score for younger children was 9.27, out of a

potential 12 points (£(1,102) =29.14, £<.001).

Although

the pattern of correct responding appeared quite
similar

at

both

ages,

and

the

on-line-questioning

condition

resulted in the best performance at both ages, it was only
at age

7

that the questioning

conditions resulted in

significantly different scores (£(2,102) =3.25,

p_<.05

Four-year olds scores averaged 9.55, 9.14, and 9.12 for
the on-line,
respectively.
the

end-of -story

,

and no-question conditions,

For 7-year olds,

the scores for children in

on-line-question condition averaged 10.61,

while the

average score for responses of children in the end-of-
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story condition was 9.94, and in the
no-question condition

was 9.85 (Bonferrori

t's (108) =2.57

2.92, p_'s<.05).

,

Nine of the presented pictures

(3

from each story)

depicted non-story events, and as expected,
7-year olds
were easily able, and 4-year olds less likely
to
reject,

these

pictures

i(106)=8.50

,

(M's=8.50

p_<.001.

and

6.81,

respectively),

Although it was expected that

children at both ages would be equally likely to
judge as

appropriate the six pictures

(two

from each story)

which

depict story events, 7-year olds proved to be better
at
this task as well (fl's=5.31 and 4.90, respectively),
t(106)=2.19, p_<.05.

Two separate analyses, on "correctness" score, and
time to respond to picture,

were carried out with respect

to the one picture for each story depicting one of the

required logical
in

inferences.

No overall

either correct responding or

obtained.

At both ages,

in

age differences

response latency were

responses to the logical

inference picture for the physical causality version were

scored as significantly more correct

than for

(1.80),

either the psychological causality version (1.57) or the

enablement

version

(1.56)

(£ 2
(

,

2 0 4)

=4

.

6 9

,

p_<.01).

Response times to these logical inference pictures were
also significantly shorter for the physical causality
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version

(1.6

sec)

causality version
sec)

than
(2.2

for

sec)

or

either

the

psychological

the enablement version

(2.3

(£(2,80)=6.31, p.<.01).

These

responses

accord with

the

to

pictures were not totally in
results obtained in the analysis of

inference questions or recall.

The average score for all

pictures was unaffected by causality version;
moreover,
the response to the one logical
inference picture was
significantly and equivalently better with the
physical
causality version at both ages.
it was expected that
older children's inferences of possible causal
factors
would lead them to include these pictures with
the other

causality versions as well.

Secondly,

the timing

of

inference questions affected picture responding for
both

age groups in

a

similar fashion,

i.e.,

was in the on-line question condition.

best performance
This stands in

contrast to the debilitating effects of on-line questions
at

age

7

previously

reported.

The

third

instance of

results which seem somewhat at odds is the rather
equivocal pattern of responses to story and non-story
pictures.

The fact that 7-year olds were able to reject

pictures depicting non-story events more readily than 4-

year olds is consonant with the inference question
performance where 7-year olds made less unconstrained, and

more constrained inferences.

Seven-year olds were also
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better than 4-year olds at judging
whether story depicting
Pictures went with the story,
however, and this finding

did

not

fit

the

previous

pattern

of

4-year

olds'

relatively good responding when
given strong story
support.
It

is

difficult to worry too seriously
about the

inconsistencies noted above between picture
responses, and
recall and inferences, however, as there
were several

inadequacies of the picture task.

it was obvious that

there was considerable misinterpretation
of the pictures'

meaning;

the

development of

ratings

considering

the

rationale of answers about the relevance of the
pictures

provided

a

partial correction, but even so, the pictures

were clearly more ambiguous than was anticipated.

The

picture queries themselves were not always communicated

unambiguously to the children either;

it seemed at

times

as though they interpreted the questions much more
generally,

and were reacting not so much to particulars of

the content, as to other, more summary features such as

temporal sequencing or main character depiction.

Finally,

the picture probes followed presentation and recall of all

three stories, and the delays and intervening material may

well have confused the children.
£ne_m._i

s_e_

ajid

_z_o_ca.___ula._ry_

me_a.s_ur_e_.s_.

Responses to
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questions about premise information as
well as vocabulary

requirements of the stories were examined.
olds were able to correctly answer premise

Seven-year

information

questions 97% of the time and 4-year olds
were correct 92%
of the time.
This high level of correct responding was

indicative of the children's active involvement
in the
listening task,
to

remember

vocabulary test

and provided evidence of their

the

basic

story material.

abilities

The

short

administered to all 4-year olds was aimed

at ascertaining whether the term "excitement" was
familiar

to them.

More than 85% of the children correctly

identified the picture chosen rather arbitrarily

represent the term,

evidence that the concept was

understood at this age level,
contextual

support.

to

even with virtually no

.

CHAPTER

IV

DISCUSSION

This

study

sheds

considerable light on several

important developmental features of story
comprehension
and

recall.

Recently,

models of text comprehension have

emphasized the concept of schema driven expectancies
which
guide understanding; and questions have arisen
concerning
when, and from where, these expectancies are generated.

A

central idea of this paper is that text can only
become
meaningful when relations between events become clear, and

while this is not
1981; Schank

&

a

new idea

(e.g.,

Nicholas

&

Trabasso,

Abelson, 1977), it remains an important

directive in the quest for process factors involved in
story-related schema models.

The recent work of Trabasso

and his co-workers concerning inference taxonomies

emphasizes functional relationships between events
text,

in

and clearly views the individual as actively

developing

a

representation of text by using knowledge

about available connections between events.

The evidence

provided in this paper takes this notion one step further
and points to the differential development in ability to

generate specific types of relations between narrative
events

Differential

reliance
58

on

the

strength

of

the
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causal chain at 4- and 7-years points
to one important
developmental change.
Four-year olds, when provided

physical causality information,

can utilize

their

knowledge to aid comprehension of stories; with
weaker
causality versions, they clearly did not understand

as

well as older children.

A parallel can be seen in younger

children's need for additional story material for
comprehension, at least when presented with the weakest
versions of the causality chain,

not

benefit

from

added

while older children did

story

material.

A

third

characterization of story comprehension development

concerns the different patterns of use of logical,
unconstrained,

and constrained inferences.

Each of these

three points will next be examined in more detail.

Strength

olds

to

the

o_X

c ausality

chain

inference questions

.

The responses of 4-year

indicates

that

their

comprehension ability is related to the type of causality

information which they encounter in stories.

They were

able to utilize information for question answering most
readily after hearing the physical causality version,

and

since this causality version represents the strongest

example of

a

causal chain included in this study, it is

important to note that younger children are able to use
this physical

causality

up story events.

information at least,

to

connect

Their performance was less good,
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however, after hearing the enablement and
psychological
causality versions.
Of course,
it was important to
ascertain whether this inability was simply

a

reflection

of younger children's lack of understanding
of the concept

employed in the psychological causality version,

and the

vocabulary test effectively ruled out this possibility.
Apparently then,

it was the

rather complex application of

causal knowledge required that baffled the children
here.

Older children,

causal chain,

in contrast,

were able to utilize the

and incorporate information relevant to

inference-making regardless of which causality version
they

heard.

Further support for the notion that the strength

of

the causality chain affects comprehension was evident with

respect

to

children's

abilities to answer specific types

of inference questions

information.

given varying amounts of story

When children heard the physical causality

version, all types of inference questions were answered

equally well, regardless of when questions were asked.
This indicates that

complete; apparently,

their story representations were very
the children had minimal difficulty

incorporating this physical
related

causality information and

interpretations of story events.

causality versions, this was not the case.

With the other
For example,
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in the enablement version,

which represented the weakest

causality version, constrained inference
questions were

more readily answered in the end-of-story
question
condition.

Constrained inference-making requires

representation which

meaningful

is

extractions

relations.

it

well
of

story

a

developed to allow

specific

events

and

for

their

interesting that in this weakest
causality version, children needed the added
story
information

is

provided in the full story, in order to make

the appropriate inferences to answer questions.

Together,

these findings suggest that not only are individual
causal

events responded to differentially—but they carry with
them a set of expectations and specific possibilities for

interpretation of story meaning which enhance the story
representation.
The facilitating effect of a strong causality chain

on text processing was also evident in recall analyses.
At both ages,

children's recall was lengthier and was

rated as showing

a

higher level of comprehension when they

experienced the physical causality version than with
either the psychological or the enablement versions.

A

related finding was that with the enablement version there

were more elaborations during recall when children were

questioned about story events after hearing the entire
story.

Since this version represented the weakest
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causality version presented, it also
suggests that the
representation called upon in recall is
not as tightly
constrained when the event-chain is relatively
weak; and
children are likely to call upon information
from direct

questioning to fill out their story accounts.

The story

representation developed by children when listening
to the
physical causality version during the on-line
questioning
of

story

events led to more

elaborations

in

indicating that with this strong causality version,

recall,
a

more

tightly constrained representation could be developed
as
the

story unfolded.

Children at both ages were also

better able to correctly respond to the pictures which
illustrated the logical inferences after listening to the
physical causality version,

and their response times were

also more rapid.
The pattern of results which emerged with respect to

this causality version manipulation

indicate

support

for

the event-chain formulation; clearly, text-based phenomena

and children's ability to utilize information provided are

critical here.

It is important to note that all causality

versions presented in this study shared the same basic
structure or

grammar

and

would have been treated as

essentially the same story from

schema description.

A model

a

more general story

simply stressing the

63

application of

a

preconceived higher-order structure
which

shapes the processing of

a

passage would not suffice as an

explanation for the differential comprehension
effects
obtained here.
The lack of any order effects upon
inferencing or recall also suggests limitations
to story
schema explanations.
AffiOiini

Ql Story material avai lable.

Seven-year olds'

ability to answer inference questions was unaffected
by
the timing of the questions, regardless of
causality
version.

This finding is consonant with that of Graesser

and his co-workers
1980),

and was

(Graesser,

expected

1981;

insofar

as

Graesser,
7-year

et al.,

olds

were

dealing with the story materials included in this study in
a

fashion similar to that seen in adult comprehension.

Younger

children,

enablement version,

information,

however,

when listening to the

which provides

the

least

causal

were better able to answer inference

questions when given more story information,

i.e.,

in the

end-of-story question condition. It was expected that
facilitating effect of increased story

a

information would

be apparent for

the younger children in all causality

versions.

finding

The

that

this

was

an

accurate

description of 4-year olds' inferencing abilities only
when provided the least causality information, however, is
certainly consistent with the expectation that inferences
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related to story development
would be enhanced when the
child had more information
available.
As detailed above,

the

children

apparently

did

not

need

this

added

information given stronger causality
chains.

Recall analyses indicated that
the timing of
questions about story events influenced
the manner in

which text-connecting inferences were
employed. At both
ages the number of elaborations
made during
recall was

greater in the conditions where questions
were asked than
in the no-question condition.
For 7-year olds,

comprehension was rated highest in the no-question
condition,

significantly

question condition.
were

rated

higher

than

Four-year olds'

slightly higher

in

in

the

on-line

recall protocols

comprehension in the

question conditions and lowest in the no-question
condition,

almost the reverse of the 7-year old data.

Questions apparently cause disruption of the processing of
story materials only for the older children.

Perhaps the

inference questions simply do not correspond well with
those the children are most likely to be generating at
this age level.

If

they have developed an independent

strategy for incorporating information relevant to the
story, and if these "private" questions, so to speak, are
not the same as those being asked by the experimenter,

it
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perhaps not surprising that the
standard inference
questions were a hindrance.
in any event, it is
is

clear

that interruptions of the story
impair the older chilren's
processing of that story material for
later recall-while

the same interruptions for

story-related questions

if

anything, enhance the processing of
story material for
younger children.
RSllS. flX

sp ecific infere nce tYPes.

Children at both ages

were quite willing to provide answers to
unconstrained
inference questions,

indicating no lack of willingness to

embellish the story line,

even at the youngest ages.

Older children were significantly slower in
responding to
these

unconstrained inferences,

by the age of seven,
of

inferences,

however;

indicating that

children tend to restrict their range

so that

information not strongly dictated

by the story is increasingly difficult to integrate.

Logical

inferences

represent

basic

causal

connections between story events, and while 7-year olds
were better able to answer these questions than 4-year
olds,

the performance of 4-year olds indicated that these

types of inferences were well within reach.
comprehension in

a

Since

wide range of tasks has been linked to

simple cause and effect relations,

it

is

perhaps not

surprising that the younger children should be able to

utilize this knowledge and provide these inference
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bridges.

Even with logical inferences,
however, there was

some improvement by age

7,

reflecting the older children's

ability to incorporate relevant story
information
regardless of which causality version they
heard.

The ability of children to answer
constrained
inference questions provides further delineation
of the
nature of story comprehension.

Roland Barthes (1977) has

suggested that, "to understand

a

narrative is not merely

to follow the unfolding of the story,

project. ..the

narrative

it is also to

'thread* ...to

listen

to

a

narrative is not merely to move from one word to the next,
it

is

also

to

move

from

one

level

to

the

next".

Constrained inferences embellish the narrative 'thread',
and enable the listener to find consistent ties,

within the story,

but

to

outside the story as well.

aspects

of

their

not only

knowledge

The contrast in ability to

apply knowledge pertinent to the story materials at the

two ages is striking.

The relative inability of younger

children to correctly answer constrained inferences may be

indicative of several inadequacies.

It is

possible that

4-year olds simply did not remember the story; however
their almost perfect recall of premise information belies
this interpretation.

More likely,

4-year olds may simply

fail to apply information that is available to them. It

67

may be that they just do not
have sufficient world
knowledge to use to connect up story
events.

Seven-year

olds

were able to employ this type
of construction,
although their performance was clearly

not at the level

for logical

inferences.

Obviously,

the development of

constrained inferencing abilities follows

a

longer time

course than was examined in this study.

Response times to inference questions
are supportive
of this general analysis.
Children at both ages responded

very and equally
questions,
is

rapidly to the logical inference

which represent basic causal connections.

not surprising that this is the case,

it

as little effort

should be necessary to integrate such important
inferences

into the story line.

Four-year olds responded at about

the same speed to all types of inference questions.

Since

it has been shown that their ability to answer
constrained

inference questions

is

much less than that of older

children, it is unlikely that their rapid response times
for these questions are

a

reflection of ease in making

these inferences; rather, it seems to be more indicative
of a general willingness to embellish the story in ways

not clearly determined by the text.
a

clear

Seven-year olds show

progression from the rapid response time to

logical inference questions to

a

much slower response time

with constrained inference questions, and still slower
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response times to unconstrained inference
questions. This
response time pattern is ordered in a
fashion reflecting
the inference taxonomy and the "relevancy
hypothesis"
suggested by Trabasso and his colleagues
(Warren,

et al.,

Both of these notions point out that those
inferences which are most important to the
developing

1979).

story line are most likely to be made.

As the inferencing

requirements move further from elements dictated by the
story, or from self-imposed inferencing strategies,
information is increasingly difficult to integrate.
The present study has pointed to a number of specific

components

of

story

materials

and

emphasized

their

importance to the comprehension process. A great deal of
the data presented here argue for the necessity of
employing some concept such as coherence (Trabasso, Secco,
&

van der Broek, 1983) for understanding the role of text

material in providing the reader (listener)
representation.

a

clear text

Trabasso, and Omanson, among others, have

argued that the attempt to understand an event is an

attempt to discover the causes of the event and the events
that result from it.
of

a

This process leads to an experience

sequence of events which allows for the development

of a cohesive

representation.

Trabasso suggests that

networks of causal fields are likely to be established and
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allow for the development of context,

and to serve as the

basis for developing story events.

The description of

causality connections within story development
which
Trabasso provides is a logical outgrowth of his
earlier

emphasis on the event chain model,

and his attempt to

describe the role of inferences in story comprehension.
Importantly, at this point, Trabasso has also attempted

to

reconcile

this

approach

with

the

description provided by story grammars.

more

global

Story grammars

have, as has been discussed earlier, led to some fairly

robust findings with respect to order and likelihood of
recall.

Trabasso has attempted to illustrate the findings

of story grammar analyses by examining the relative amount

of causal connections which are included in each of the

categorical divisions suggested in the story grammar
analyses.

In general,

he finds a great deal of overlap in

the grammatical and the causality characterizations,

argues that process factors will emerge only when

analysis is examined.

approach has never

a

but

causal

The emphasis of the story grammar

really been on causal connections

between events, however, and whenever any allusion to
causal chains has been made,

has been stressed.

a linear

unfolding of events

A major message from both Trabasso's

work and the present study is that the story grammar

approach is limited in ability to analyze processing
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factors in story comprehension.
A further perspective is provided
by Barthes (1977)

who reminds us of the active, continual,
quality of the
search

for

understanding,

not at the end of the

suggesting that "meaning

narrative,

it

runs across

...

is

it".

Through an experimental test of some elements
of the
inference taxonomy, and consideration of issues
related to
the event chain model and the use of inference
questions,

the present study has clarified some components of
the

development of those processes enabling extraction of
information,
and connection of separate events in
stories.

A number of findings make it obvious that some

meaning is less difficult to cull from
apply to later story events.

Thus,

a

story and to

inferences are clearly

easier when strongly driven by logical causality, and even
very young children draw inferences of this type to bridge

the gaps between story events.
other

inferences,

constraints,

Selective production of

limited to those mandated by the story

is a much later developing ability,

however,

far from complete at the age of the older children

included in this study.
or

Inferences that are superfluous

irrelevant are no longer as readily elicited,

however,

indicating partial refinement of this skill.
All attempts to study story comprehension,

including
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the story grammars, the scriptal based
conceptualizations,

and those based on causal connections,

start with the

assumption that story events are interconnected
in some
fashion.

This study makes it apparent that the
nature of

these interconnections may be very complex,

and very

different in character at different stages of
development.
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Warm-up story 1
George was a monkey in the zoo.
One day, when the keeper was not
looking,
George took the key for his cage
and ran away.
Questions;
1. What kind of an animal was George?
2. Where did George live?
3. Why did George take the key?
4. Was the zoo keeper a man or a woman?

Warm-up story 2
Policeman Small is a traffic cop
who tells the cars when to stop and go. (Q-l)
One day, a farm truck went by
and a milk can fell out the back onto the road. (Q-2)
They put the can back on the truck. (Q-3)
When they turned around,
they saw two kittens licking the road. (Q-4)
Questions;
1. What does Policeman Small do?
2. What color do you think the truck is?
3. Who do you think put the can back?
4. Why were the kittens licking the road?
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Jennifer
One day Jennifer's parents gave her a
dollar
because she wanted to buy a turtle. (Q-l)
But as she was walking to the petstore
she turned a somersault and lost it.
(Q-2) (physical
causality version)
she
became
very excited and lost
it
(Q-2)
(psychological causality version)
she lost it (Q-2) (enablement version)
Jennifer was worried that her parents would be
angry with
so she decided to search every bit of the
sidewalk. (Q-3)
For
ten long minutes she looked in all the cracks
and
grass. (Q-4)
Finally she found the dollar. (Q-5)
When she got to the store she was told
that the last turtle had been sold just one minute ago.
(Q-6)

Questions fox "Jennifer"
Logical

Constrained

(Q-2) What made

Jennifer
her

Unconstrained

(Q-l) How old do

lose
dollar?

think Jennifer is?

(Q-3) Why would

(Q-5) Do you think
Jennifer has a
dollar bill or a
dollar in change?

Jennifer's parents be angry
with her?

Premise Questions
1.
What did Jennifer want to buy?
Who gave Jennifer the dollar?
2.
:

(Q-4)What color
hair do you
think Jennfer has?
(Q-6)Was the
person in the
petstore a man
or a woman?
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Tom

it disapeared.

(Q-2) (enablement version)
Tom knew that the kite was his brother's favorite toy,
so he decided to buy another just like it. (Q-3)
He looked in many stores. (Q-4)
After awhile, he found a new kite. (Q-5)
When he got home, Tom found that his brother had also been
to a store,
and had bought Tom his very own kite. (Q-6)

Questions
Logical

Iqjl "Tom

Constrained

(Q-2) What made

II

Unconstrained

(Q-l)What time
of year did
do you think
this story
happened?

the kite disappear?

(Q-3) How did

(Q-5)Do you
think the new
kite was the
same as the
old kite or
were they different?

Tom know that
the kite was
his brother's
favorite?

Premise questions
Whose kite did Tom play with?
1.
2.
Did the kite fly high?
:

(Q-4) Was Tom a
tall boy or was

he short?

(Q-6) What do

think Tom's
brother's name
was?
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Carol

One day Carol's friend asked her if
she wanted to learn
din
how to ice skate. (Q-l)
But as she was walking to the pond
she
started to run down the hill and twisted
her
ankle.
(Q-2) (physical causality version)
she
became
very
excited
and
twisted
her
ankle.
(Q-2) (psychological causality version)
she twisted her ankle. (Q-2) (enablement version)
Carol was upset that she would have to miss
the iceskating
and decided to get home as soon as she could. (Q-3)
Slowly she limped along the path. (Q-4)
At last she was safely home.(Q-5)
Later that day all of her friends came over
and
had cookies and hot chocolate while they sang
songs. (Q-6)
,

Questions for "Carol"

Logical

Constrained

Unconstrained

(Q-2) What made

(Q-l) Does Carol

Carol twist
her ankle?

have ice skates?

(Q-3) Why did

(Q-5)Do you think
Carol lives in the
city or in the

Carol decide
to go home?

country?

Premise Questions
What did Carol's friend ask her?
1.
2.
Where was Carol going?
:

(Q-4)Did Carol
have blue eyes
or did she have
brown eyes?
(Q-6) What kind

cookies do you
think Carol
ate?

APPENDIX B
Picture and Vocabulary Stimuli
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"

Pictures for "Jennifer
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Pictures for "Tom"

Pictures for "Carol"
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giraffe
money
anger
excitement

